1. **Separate results for ratings of advantaged vs. disadvantaged groups**

In the main manuscript, we examined overall power differences by examining the difference in the average rated power of disadvantaged groups (Whites, Men, and upper class individuals) subtracted from the average rated power of advantaged groups (Blacks, Women, and middle and lower class individuals). In the analyses below, we conduct the same analyses but now examining the average rated power of advantaged groups and the average rated power of disadvantaged groups separately.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Disadvantaged Group Power | Overall Egalitarian Policy Support |
| SDO (logged) | .06 | -.56\*\*\* |
| Social Conservatism | .01 | -.14\*\*\* |
| Social Class | .03 | -.08\*\* |
| Race | .06 | -.13\*\*\* |
| Sex | -.01 | -.07\*\* |
| Disadvantaged Group Power | -- | -.23\*\*\* |
| Indirect effect (SDO 🡪 Power difference 🡪 Policy) | -- | -.03 [-.07, .02] |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Advantaged Group Power | Overall Egalitarian Policy Support |
| SDO (logged) | -.39\*\*\* | -.53\*\*\* |
| Social Conservatism | -.11\*\* | -.13\*\*\* |
| Social Class | .01 | -.09\*\* |
| Race | -.14\*\*\* | -.13\*\*\* |
| Sex | -.10\*\* | -.06\* |
| Advantaged Group Power | -- | .12\*\*\* |
| Indirect effect (SDO 🡪 Power difference 🡪 Policy) | -- | -.09 [-.14, -.04] |

Study 1a:

Whereas SDO was not significantly associated with perceiving more power for women or Black Americans, it was significantly associated (controlling for social class and social conservatism) with perceiving more power for middle and lower class individuals (β = .17, *p* < .001).

Study 1b:

Effects of SDO-Wave 1 on Advantaged Group Power-Wave 2, controlling for Advantaged Group Power-Wave 1: *b* = -4.87, β = -.17, *p* = .004

Effects of SDO-Wave 1 on Disadvantaged Group Power-Wave 2, controlling for Disadvantaged Group Power-Wave 2: *b* = 2.07, β = .06, *p* = .23

Supplemental Study 1

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Advantaged Group Power | Overall Egalitarian Policy Support |
| SDO (logged) | -.32\*\*\* | -.55\*\*\* |
| Social Conservatism | -.21\*\* | -.20\*\*\* |
| Social Class | -.01 | -.08\* |
| Sex | -.17\*\*\* | -.06 |
| Advantaged Group Power | -- | .15\*\*\* |
| Indirect effect (SDO 🡪 Power difference 🡪 Policy) | -- | -.10 [-.16, -.05] |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Disadvantaged Group Power | Overall Egalitarian Policy Support |
| SDO (logged) | .21\*\*\* | -.59\*\*\* |
| Social Conservatism | .19\*\*\* | -.22\*\*\* |
| Social Class | -.02 | -.08\* |
| Sex | .02 | -.08\*\* |
| Disadvantaged Group Power | -- | -.06† |
| Indirect effect (SDO 🡪 Power difference 🡪 Policy) | -- | -.02 [-.06, -.0002] |

Study 2:

Advantaged group:

SDO on group power: *b* = -8.72, β *=*-.26, *p* = .002.

Group power on egalitarian policy: *b* = .025, β = .25, *p* = .001

Indirect effect= -.22, 95% CI [-.42, -.09]

Disadvantaged group:

SDO on group power: *b* = 10.16, β *=* .26, *p* = .004.

Group power on egalitarian policy: *b* = -.02, *Β* = .20, *p* = .01

Indirect effect= -.17, 95% CI [-.38, -.06]

In Supplemental Study 2, participants responded to perceptions of power differences between groups on one bipolar scale (with higher scores indicating greater perceptions of power for the advantaged group and lower scores indicating greater perceptions of power for the disadvantaged group). Thus, we are unable to conduct separate analyses for each group.

In the remaining studies (3a-5 & Supplemental Studies 3-4), participants were not asked to reflect on the power of each group individually, but rather on the overall hierarchical nature of the images they were looking at. Thus, we are again unable to conduct separate analyses for each group.

1. **SDO Distribution**

Study 1a

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Minimum | Maximum | Std. Dev | Skewness | *SE*(Skewness) |
| SDO | 2.67 | 1.00 | 6.25 | 1.19 | .195 | .092 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Percentile | SDO |
| 10 | 1.13 |
| 20 | 1.38 |
| 30 | 1.75 |
| 40 | 2.06 |
| 50 | 2.56 |
| 60 | 3.07 |
| 70 | 3.63 |
| 80 | 3.94 |
| 90 | 4.19 |

Study 1b

Wave 1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Minimum | Maximum | Std. Dev | Skewness | *SE*(Skewness) |
| SDO | 2.63 | 1.00 | 6.06 | 1.16 | .31 | .13 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Percentile | SDO |
| 10 | 1.06 |
| 20 | 1.40 |
| 30 | 1.81 |
| 40 | 2.19 |
| 50 | 2.50 |
| 60 | 2.88 |
| 70 | 3.38 |
| 80 | 3.75 |
| 90 | 4.19 |

Wave 2

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Minimum | Maximum | Std. Dev | Skewness | *SE*(Skewness) |
| SDO | 2.51 | 1.00 | 6.44 | 1.21 | .47 | .15 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Percentile | SDO |
| 10 | 1.00 |
| 20 | 1.33 |
| 30 | 1.56 |
| 40 | 1.94 |
| 50 | 2.35 |
| 60 | 2.75 |
| 70 | 3.31 |
| 80 | 3.81 |
| 90 | 4.06 |

Supplemental Study 1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Minimum | Maximum | Std. Dev | Skewness | *SE*(Skewness) |
| SDO | 2.45 | 1.00 | 6.50 | 1.18 | .76 | .11 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Percentile | SDO |
| 10 | 1.06 |
| 20 | 1.31 |
| 30 | 1.56 |
| 40 | 1.88 |
| 50 | 2.19 |
| 60 | 2.63 |
| 70 | 3.00 |
| 80 | 3.56 |
| 90 | 4.06 |

Study 2

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Minimum | Maximum | Std. Dev | Skewness | *SE*(Skewness) |
| SDO | 2.74 | 1.00 | 5.44 | 1.08 | .26 | .19 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Percentile | SDO |
| 10 | 1.31 |
| 20 | 1.75 |
| 30 | 2.00 |
| 40 | 2.38 |
| 50 | 2.69 |
| 60 | 3.00 |
| 70 | 3.31 |
| 80 | 3.75 |
| 90 | 4.25 |

Supplemental Study 2

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Minimum | Maximum | Std. Dev | Skewness | *SE*(Skewness) |
| SDO | 2.72 | 1.00 | 5.69 | 1.15 | .33 | .27 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Percentile | SDO |
| 10 | 1.13 |
| 20 | 1.56 |
| 30 | 2.00 |
| 40 | 2.25 |
| 50 | 2.69 |
| 60 | 2.88 |
| 70 | 3.44 |
| 80 | 3.81 |
| 90 | 4.44 |

Study 3a

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Minimum | Maximum | Std. Dev | Skewness | *SE*(Skewness) |
| SDO | 2.75 | 1.69 | 5.31 | .82 | .498 | .194 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Percentile | SDO |
| 10 | 1.75 |
| 20 | 1.88 |
| 30 | 2.13 |
| 40 | 2.43 |
| 50 | 2.66 |
| 60 | 3.00 |
| 70 | 3.19 |
| 80 | 3.50 |
| 90 | 3.96 |

Study 3b

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Minimum | Maximum | Std. Dev | Skewness | *SE*(Skewness) |
| SDO | 2.49 | 1.00 | 6.19 | 1.21 | .469 | .16 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Percentile | SDO |
| 10 | 1.00 |
| 20 | 1.14 |
| 30 | 1.56 |
| 40 | 2.00 |
| 50 | 2.28 |
| 60 | 2.81 |
| 70 | 3.17 |
| 80 | 3.75 |
| 90 | 4.13 |

Study 3c did not use SDO.

Supplemental Study 3

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Minimum | Maximum | Std. Dev | Skewness | *SE*(Skewness) |
| SDO | 2.87 | 1.63 | 5.31 | .82 | .55 | .21 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Percentile | SDO |
| 10 | 1.85 |
| 20 | 2.06 |
| 30 | 2.31 |
| 40 | 2.56 |
| 50 | 2.75 |
| 60 | 3.08 |
| 70 | 3.33 |
| 80 | 3.63 |
| 90 | 3.96 |

Study 4

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Minimum | Maximum | Std. Dev | Skewness | *SE*(Skewness) |
| SDO | 2.31 | 1.00 | 7.00 | 1.20 | .86 | .14 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Percentile | SDO |
| 10 | 1.00 |
| 20 | 1.13 |
| 30 | 1.38 |
| 40 | 1.75 |
| 50 | 2.06 |
| 60 | 2.38 |
| 70 | 2.88 |
| 80 | 3.44 |
| 90 | 4.13 |

Supplemental Study 4

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Minimum | Maximum | Std. Dev | Skewness | *SE*(Skewness) |
| SDO | 2.45 | 1.00 | 6.94 | 1.23 | .78 | .14 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Percentile | SDO |
| 10 | 1.00 |
| 20 | 1.25 |
| 30 | 1.50 |
| 40 | 1.94 |
| 50 | 2.25 |
| 60 | 2.63 |
| 70 | 3.06 |
| 80 | 3.58 |
| 90 | 4.13 |

Study 5

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Mean | Minimum | Maximum | Std. Dev | Skewness | *SE*(Skewness) |
| SDO | 2.70 | 1.00 | 6.00 | .93 | .81 | .11 |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Percentile | SDO |
| 10 | 1.75 |
| 20 | 1.81 |
| 30 | 2.00 |
| 40 | 2.25 |
| 50 | 2.50 |
| 60 | 2.75 |
| 70 | 3.06 |
| 80 | 3.55 |
| 90 | 4.00 |

1. **Results without controlling for social conservatism**

Study 1a

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Overall Power Diff | Overall Egalitarian Policy Support |
| SDO (logged) | -.40\*\*\* | -.51\*\*\* |
| Social Class | -.01 | -.08\*\* |
| Race | -.15\*\*\* | -.10\*\*\* |
| Sex | -.01 | -.05\* |
| Overall Power Diff | -- | .30\*\*\* |
| Indirect effect (SDO 🡪  Power difference 🡪 Policy) | -- | -.23 [-.31, -.18] |

Supplemental Study 1

Study 2

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Overall Power Diff | Overall Egalitarian Policy Support |
| SDO (logged) | -.47\*\*\* | -.57\*\*\* |
| Social Class | .01 | -.04 |
| Sex | -.16\*\*\* | -.05 |
| Overall Power Diff | -- | .24\*\*\* |
| Indirect effect (SDO 🡪 Power difference 🡪 Policy) | -- | -.23 [-.30, -.16] |

SDO on perception of power differences: β = -.28, *p* = .003

Perception of power differences on support for egalitarian social policy: β = .24, *p* = .004.

Indirect effect of SDO on support for egalitarian social policy through power differences: -.22 [-.41, -.09

Supplemental Study 2

SDO on perception of power differences: β = -.41, *p* < .001

Perception of power differences on support for egalitarian social policy: β = .23, *p* = .024.

Indirect effect of SDO on support for egalitarian social policy through power differences: -.19 [-.47, -.02]

Study 3a

SDO on perception of power differences: β = -.45, *p* < .001

Perception of power differences on support for egalitarian social policy: β = .43, *p* < .001.

Indirect effect of SDO on support for egalitarian social policy through power differences: -.80 [-1.25, -.41]

Study 3b

SDO on perception of power differences: β = -.42, *p* < .001

Perception of power differences on support for egalitarian social policy: β = .35, *p* < .001.

Indirect effect of SDO on support for egalitarian social policy through power differences: -.30 [-.44, -.18]

Study 3c

(Analyses here refer to results not controlling for traditionalism)

McCloskey & Bann measure of egalitarianism on perception of power differences: β = -.35, *p* < .001

Hatemi et al. measure of egalitarianism on perception of power differences: : β = -.35, *p* < .001

Indirect effect of McCloskey & Bann measure of egalitarianism on support for egalitarian social policy through power differences: -.09 [-.15, -.04]

Indirect effect of Hatemi et al. measure of egalitarianism on support for egalitarian social policy through power differences: -.07 [-.13, -.03]

Supplemental Study 3

SDO on perception of power differences: β = -.43, *p* < .001

Perception of power differences on support for egalitarian social policy: β = .53, *p* < .001.

Indirect effect of SDO on support for egalitarian social policy through power differences: -.85 [-1.30, -.51]

Study 4

Overall: SDO on perception of power differences: β = -.24, *p* < .001

Control condition: SDO on perception of power differences: β = -.29, *p* < .001

Incentivized condition: SDO on perception of power differences: β *=* -.23, *p* = .003

Interaction (SDO\*condition): *b* = .07, *p* = .67.

Supplemental Study 4

Overall: SDO on perception of power differences: β = -.29, *p* < .001

Control condition: SDO on perception of power differences: β = -.29, *p* < .001

Incentivized condition: SDO on perception of power differences: β *=* -.29, *p* < .001

Interaction (SDO\*condition): *b* = -.04, *p* = .81.

Study 5

See main text.

1. **Moderation by group membership**

In the below analyses, we examined whether our hypothesized indirect pathway (i.e., SDO 🡪 power perceptions 🡪 policy support) is moderated by gender, class, or membership in a majority (i.e., White) vs. minority racial group. Throughout, variables are coded such that, for gender: 0=male and 1=female; for majority group membership: 0 =minority group member and 1= majority group member; for class: higher numbers indicate higher class.

For the studies where policy support is not included, we examine whether the SDO🡪 power perceptions link is moderated by these variables. Results of these analyses for Study 1a (main text), Study 1b (main text), and Supplemental Study 1 (section 9 of the Supplemental Materials) are included in the primary text describing the results of these studies.

Study 2b

Moderation by gender: Index of moderated mediation = .00 [-.26, .27]

Moderation by majority group membership: Index of moderated mediation = -.31 [-.79, -.01]

Moderation by social class: Index of moderated mediation = -.14 [-.34, -.01]

Supplemental Study 2

Moderation by gender: Index of moderated mediation = -.04 [-.45, .18]

Moderation by majority group membership: Index of moderated mediation = .02 [-.20, .39]

Moderation by social class: Index of moderated mediation = -.03 [-.25, .08]

Study 3a

Moderation by gender: Index of moderated mediation = -.22 [-.70, .29]

Moderation by majority group membership: Index of moderated mediation = .18 [-.46, .83]

Moderation by social class (assessed by income levels): Index of moderated mediation = -.12 [-.24, -.03]

Study 3b

Moderation by gender: Index of moderated mediation = .08 [-.08, .27]

Moderation by majority group membership: Index of moderated mediation = .06 [-.14, .23]

Moderation by social class (assessed by income levels): Index of moderated mediation = -.01 [-.06, .03]

Study 3c

McCloskey and Bann measure:

Moderation by gender: Index of moderated mediation = -.03 [-.12, .03]

Moderation by majority group membership: Index of moderated mediation = -.04 [-.14, .02]

Moderation by social class (assessed by income levels): Index of moderated mediation = .00 [-.01, .02]

Hatemi et al. measure:

Moderation by gender: Index of moderated mediation = .00 [-.06, .06]

Moderation by majority group membership: Index of moderated mediation = -.00 [-.02, .01]

Moderation by social class (assessed by income levels): Index of moderated mediation = .01 [-.06, .08]

Supplemental Study 3

Moderation by gender: Index of moderated mediation = .29 [-.30, 1.03]

Moderation by majority group membership: Index of moderated mediation = .07 [-.86, .90]

Moderation by social class (assessed by income levels): *b* = -.05 [-.23, .12]

Study 4

(Analyses collapsed across condition)

Moderation by gender: *b* = -.08, *p* = .64.

Moderation by majority group membership: *b* = .38, *p* = .045.

Moderation by social class (assessed by income levels): *b* = .00, *p* = .95.

Supplemental Study 4

(Analyses collapsed across condition)

Moderation by gender: *b* = -.03, *p* = .85.

Moderation by majority group membership: *b* = .25, *p* = .22.

Moderation by social class (assessed by income levels): *b* = -.05, *p* = .20.

Study 5

D.V. = Hierarchy memory bias

Moderation by gender: *b* = -.08, *p* = .77.

Moderation by majority group membership: *b* = .30, *p* = .31

Moderation by social class (assessed by income levels): *b* = .00, *p* = .98.

1. **Weighting organization selection by level of organizational hierarchy in Study 5 (see footnote 16)**

In this analysis, we weighted each response by the level of hierarchy of the organization selected. Thus, in each set, we gave participants a score of -2 for incorrectly choosing the least hierarchical triangle, -1 for incorrectly choosing the second-least hierarchical organization, 0 for an accurate selection, +1 for incorrectly choosing the second-most hierarchical organization, and +2 for incorrectly choosing the most hierarchical organization. Then, as in the analyses in the main text, we summed participants’ scores for the trials in which they overestimated and underestimated, and computed a difference score (#trials overestimated - #trials underestimated) to assess a hierarchy memory bias.

Using this metric, we observed the following patterns:

Zero-order correlations:

SDO (logged) and hierarchy memory bias: *r* = -.11, *p* = .01.

SDO (logged) and overestimating hierarchy*: r* = -.09, *p* = .04.

SDO (logged) and underestimating hierarchy: *r* = .07, *p* = .10.

Social conservatism and hierarchy memory bias: *r* = .05, *p* = .24

Social conservatism and overestimating hierarchy: *r* = .03, *p* = .46

Social conservatism and underestimating hierarchy: *r* = -.07, *p* = .09

Regressions:

Hierarchy memory bias:

SDO (logged): *b =* -45, β = -.14, *p* = .001*,* 95% CI [-.71, -.18]

Social conservatism: *b* = .08, β = .09, *p* = .08, 95% CI [-.01, .16]

Overestimating hierarchy (Poisson regression):

SDO (logged): *b* = -.20, Wald χ2 = 6.01, *p* = .014, 95% CI [-.36, -.04]

Social conservatism: *b* = .04, Wald χ2 = 1.21, *p* = .27, 95% CI [-.02, .08]

Underestimating hierarchy (Poisson regression):

SDO (logged): *b* = .14, Wald χ2 = 5.77, *p* = .016, 95% CI [.03, .26]

Social conservatism: *b* = -.04, Wald χ2 = 3.52, *p* = .061, 95% CI [-.07, .002]

1. **Supplemental analyses consistent for a *motivated* link between SDO and perception of power differences**

Our theorizing suggests that the pattern we observe whereby individuals higher in SDO perceive less hierarchy between groups than individuals lower in SDO reflects motivated cognition. Specifically, we reasoned that because the U.S. has egalitarian norms, people recognize that a great degree of hierarchy in society will increase social pressure towards equality. Thus, when faced with hierarchy, individuals high in SDO should be motivated to perceive less of it, bolstering their resistance to egalitarian social change. On the other hand, individuals low in SDO, who seek to achieve equality, should be motivated to perceive more hierarchy, bolstering their efforts to seek support for implementing egalitarian social policy.

Our theorizing regarding the link between SDO and perception of hierarchy generates a testable prediction that would support the idea that the patterns we observe reflect a motivated bias rooted in awareness of social norms about hierarchy. Specifically, if high SDO individuals are motivated to perceive less hierarchy because social pressures for hierarchy-attenuation increase when hierarchy is great, one might expect that motive to strengthen as hierarchy in society increases and becomes more visible (and thus more subject to social censure). Conversely, if low SDO individuals are motivated to perceive more hierarchy because they want to elicit social concern and curry favor for egalitarian social change, this motivation should strengthen as hierarchy in society becomes less visible (and thus more likely to fly under the radar).

If this reasoning is correct, it would follow that the bias of high SDO individuals to under-perceive hierarchy should get stronger the more hierarchical the entity they are being asked to rate is. Conversely, low SDO individuals’ bias to over-perceive hierarchy should get stronger the *less* hierarchical the entity they are being asked to rate is.

We examined whether this pattern obtained across Studies 3b and 4, where a large set of individuals whose SDO levels we measured were asked to rate the hierarchy of the same fictional organizations. Specifically, we examined the extent to which the hierarchy ratings of individuals low and high on SDO *differed* from those who had more moderate scores on SDO as a function of the degree of hierarchy of the organization in question.

We reasoned that when an organization was relatively low on hierarchy, individuals high on SDO might not feel as strong a motivation to under-perceive the inequality therein. However, as the organization being rated became more hierarchical (and thus more likely to evoke pressure towards equality), we expected the motive for high SDO individuals to become more active, resulting in a greater divergence from the view of individuals moderate on SDO.

We expected the reverse for individuals low on SDO: Because there should be less need to ‘call attention’ to hierarchy when it is greater than when it is less visible, we expected that low SDO individuals’ perceptions would diverge more from the perceptions of individuals moderate on SDO the *less* hierarchical the organizations became.

A **stylized** pattern reflecting these predictions is below:

(This pattern represent one general example of what this reasoning might predict. The values plotted are fictional)

These same data can be presented in another way, using the (absolute value of the) *difference* *score* from the ‘average SDO’ category (i.e., reflecting *bias* among those high and low in SDO). We take the absolute value of the difference here for ease of presentation, but we note that the numbers for high SDO individuals reflect under-perceiving hierarchy whereas for low SDO individuals they reflect over-perceiving hierarchy (relative to those average in SDO).

As can be seen in the (stylized) figure below, the slope for high SDO individuals is expected to be positive, whereas the slope for the low SDO individuals is expected to be negative.

Because we wanted to test these predictions using a large sample (particularly as we were splitting the sample into thirds; see below), we examined it using the combined data on the perception of hierarchical organizations in Studies 3b and 4 (*N* = 579).

We used the following analytical approach:

We split the sample into tertiles, in order to create three separate and equally-sized groups reflecting individuals low, average, and high in SDO. Thus, the low SDO group reflected the 1/3 of the sample with the lowest SDO scores. The high SDO group reflected the 1/3 of the sample with the highest SDO scores. The average SDO group reflected the remaining 1/3 of the sample with SDO scores in between those of the bottom third and upper third. Consistent with our general analytic approach, we used logged SDO scores, though we note that results were consistent throughout using the non-logged SDO scores.[[1]](#footnote-1)

Next, we computed the mean ratings for each group, for each organization (ranging from least to most hierarchical).

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Organization 1 | Organization 2 | Organization 3 | Organization 4 | Organization 5 |
| Low SDO | 4.59 | 5.13 | 5.46 | 5.86 | 6.04 |
| Average SDO | 4.22 | 4.70 | 5.16 | 5.74 | 5.82 |
| High SDO | 4.21 | 4.41 | 4.74 | 5.18 | 5.34 |

From these numbers, we computed a ‘distance from average’ for each organization for the low and high SDO groups.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Organization 1 | Organization 2 | Organization 3 | Organization 4 | Organization 5 |
| Low SDO | 0.37 | 0.43 | 0.30 | 0.12 | 0.23 |
| High SDO | 0.012 | 0.29 | 0.42 | 0.56 | 0.48 |

When plotted, these data generate the following patterns:

It should be noted that the difference in the average SDO groups’ ratings of organizations 4 (5.74) and 5 (5.81) (i.e., 5.81 - 5.74 = .07) is more subtle than the differences in their ratings of organization 1 (4.22) and organization 2 (4.69) (i.e., 4.69 - 4.22 = 0.47). Thus, although each organization is rated as more hierarchical than the previous one, their relationship is more ordinal than it is interval. Thus, it is not fully appropriate to treat the increases in each step from organization 1 to organization 5 as equivalent.

At the same time, the difference between the average rating of Organizations 1 and 2 (i.e., 4.22 + 4.69/2) and Organization 3 (5.15) is comparable to the difference between organization 3 and the average rating of Organizations 4 and 5 (i.e., 5.74 + 5.81/2).

Specifically: 5.15 - (4.22+ 4.69/2) = 5.15 - 4.46 = 0.69.

and (5.74+ 5.81/2) - 5.15 = 5.78 - 5.15 = 0.63.

Thus, it may be more appropriate to treat the data collapsing ratings of the two less hierarchical triangles and the two more hierarchical triangles.

Approached in this manner, we arrive at the following numbers:

(Overall ratings)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Organization 1 + 2 | Organization 3 | Organization 4 + 5 |
| Low SDO | 4.86 | 5.46 | 5.95 |
| Average SDO | 4.46 | 5.16 | 5.78 |
| High SDO | 4.3106 | 4.7397 | 5.26145 |

(Difference from Average SDO)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Organization 1 + 2 | Organization 3 | Organization 4 + 5 |
| Low SDO | 0.40 | 0.30 | 0.17 |
| High SDO | 0.15 | 0.42 | 0.52 |

When plotted, these data generate the following patterns:

We next examined the spearman’s rho correlation (for ordinal data) for the slopes of the lines of the low and high SDO groups. Although these relationships should be interpreted with caution given that they are based on very few data points, we observed the following[[2]](#footnote-2):

When all 5 triangles were used:

Low SDO: spearman’s rho = -.80, *p* = .10

High SDO: spearman’s rho = .90, *p* = .04.

When 3 triangles were used:

Low SDO: spearmans’ rho = -1.00, *p* < .001

High SDO: spearman’s rho = 1.00, *p* < .001

In sum, these patterns are largely consistent with a motivated perception account. We observe that when the organizations being rated are low in their degree of hierarchy, individuals high in SDO continue to rate them as less hierarchical than individuals with more moderate SDO levels, but this gap is relatively small. As the organizations get more hierarchical, however, high SDO individuals begin to deviate more from the average view. This pattern is consistent with the idea that high SDO individuals are particularly motivated to under-perceive hierarchy that is more visible and likely to be subject to social pressure towards equality.

Low SDO individuals show the opposite pattern. Their perceptions do not diverge much from those with moderate SDO levels when hierarchy is high. However, when hierarchy is relatively low (and thus more likely to fall ‘beneath the radar’ of social attention), the perceptions of individuals low on SDO diverge more from those with moderate levels.

Finally, we note that we also had two other near-identical datasets, Supplemental Studies 3 and 4. The only substantive difference between the current Study 3b and Supplemental Study 3 is the fact that in the Supplemental Study 3, SDO was always assessed after ratings of hierarchy. The only substantive difference between Study 4 and Supplemental Study 4 is that in the Supplemental Study 4, participants in the incentivized condition were told that the participant whose answers were closest to those of a prior pool of respondents would receive the cash bonus. To increase confidence in the above results, we replicated the above analysis using the data Supplemental Studies 3 and 4 (*N* = 486).

Although we do not repeat the entire analysis for the sake of brevity (full details are available from the first author by request), we plot the patterns obtained here. As can be seen, these patterns are very similar to those noted above (we again present results creating 3 categories, because the same pattern noted above obtained in this case, too).

This was also true when we pooled the entirety of the data available to us on this question (i.e., Study 3b, Study 4, Supplemental Study 3, Supplemental Study 4; *N* = 1,065):

1. **Supplemental Analyses for Study 3c (Examining economic conservatism)**

In addition to assessing anti-egalitarianism and traditionalism in Study 3c, we also assessed items tapping economic conservatism. Specifically, we assessed economic conservatism using 14 items from McCloskey and Bann (1979, as cited in Knight, 1999; sample item: “A person’s wage should depend on the importance of their job”; “The profit system teaches people the value of hard work and success”; α= .90; see Supplemental Materials, Section 10 for full scale).

Notably, some theoretical perspectives (e.g., Tetlock & Mitchell, 1993) hold that support for these types of ideas—typically associated with economic conservatism in the American context— need not reflect opposition to equality *per se*, even if some imply a likelihood of unequal outcomes. For example, individuals might endorse the idea that a person’s wage should depend on the importance of their job (rather than the level of their need) because they believe that economic incentives will drive greater overall economic growth for the nation, and not primarily because they desire unequal outcomes between individuals. On the other hand, other theoretical perspectives (e.g., Jost et al., 2009) conceive of opposition to equality as an important basis of political conservatism.

Here, we examined whether economic conservatism would show effects similar to anti-egalitarianism on perception of power differences. Of note, we found that our measure of economic conservatism was very highly correlated with both measures of anti-egalitarianism (McCloskey & Bann measure: *r* = .79, *p* < .001; Hatemi et al. measure: *r* = .80, *p* < .001). Moreover, when we examined its relationship with perception of power differences, we observed patterns highly consistent with those we had observed using anti-egalitarianism. Specifically, economic conservatism was uniquely associated with perception of power differences regardless of which measure of traditionalism was used as a control: Controlling for the McCloskey & Bann (1979) traditionalism measure: *b* = -.22, β = -.30, *p* < .001, 95% CI [-.33, -.11]; Controlling for the Ray (1983) traditionalism measure: *b* = -.21, β = -.29, *p* < .001, 95% CI [-.30, -.11].

1. **Results (presented separately) from the original test and the exact replication of the data in Study 5**

Below, we report the results of our original test and our exact replication (which were merged for the reporting of Study 5 in the main manuscript) separately.

**Original Test**

We sampled 226 participants (*M* age= 34.20, *SD* = 11.64, 54.6% female; 146 Caucasian/White American; 17 Asian/Asian American; 16 African American/Black; 12 Latino/Hispanic American; 5 Jewish; 3 Native American; 1 Middle Eastern; 6 biracial/mixed race; 1 Other; 19 missing), of whom 208 provided data on all focal variables. We used the same stimuli, measures, and procedures as reported in the main manuscript. Our measure of social dominance orientation (α =.94) was reliable.

Across the image sets, we computed a score reflecting accuracy and direction of errors: specifically, for each of the four image sets, participants were given a score of 0 if they correctly identified the image they had previously seen, a score of -1 if they incorrectly indicated having seen a *less* hierarchical image than they actually had, and a score of +1 if they incorrectly indicated having seen a *more* hierarchical image. We summed participants’ scores across the four image sets to compute our variable of *hierarchy memory bias*. On this index, negative scores indicated an overall tendency towards underestimating the level of hierarchy one had seen previously, and positive scores indicated a tendency towards overestimating the same.

On average, this was a difficult task for participants: 39.3% of participants did not make the accurate selection for any of the four image sets, 43.3% made one accurate selection, 16.1% made two accurate selections, and 1.3% made three accurate selections. No participants were accurate for all four trials. On average, there was a slight bias towards remembering less hierarchy (*M* = -.42, *SD* = 1.64, one-sample *t*(223)= -3.87, *p* < .001).

We next turned to examine our central hypothesis. In zero-order terms, SDO was negatively but non-significantly correlated with memory bias, *r* = -.11, *p* = .11; social conservatism was marginally positively associated (*r* = .12, *p* = .09). When we entered SDO and social conservatism as predictors into a simultaneous regression, we observed that SDO was negatively associated with hierarchy memory bias (*b* = -.50, β = -.16, *p* = .03, 95% CI: [-.98, -.05]). On the other hand, social conservatism was positively associated with memory bias (*b* = .15, β = .16, *p* = .05, 95% CI: [.003, .30]). Thus, our results tentatively suggested that the higher an individuals’ level of SDO, the greater their tendency to incorrectly remember having seen less hierarchical organizations than they actually had seen (and the less their tendency to misremember having seen more hierarchal organizations).

Importantly, our outcome measure simultaneously took into account trials in which participants had overestimated hierarchy, had underestimated it, or had been accurate. In order to distinguish between these, we created two additional outcome measures: the first, labeled *underestimation of hierarchy*, simply indexed the number of trials in which participants had selected a less hierarchical image than they had actually seen. The second, labeled *overestimation of hierarchy*, indexed the number of trials in which participants had selected a *more* hierarchical image than they had actually seen.

We examined each of these outcomes separately. In zero-order terms, SDO was marginally positively associated with underestimation of hierarchy (*r* = .12, *p* = .09) whereas social conservatism was significantly negatively associated (*r* = -.15, *p* = .03). When entered into a simultaneous Poisson regression, SDO was significantly and positively associated with underestimation of hierarchy (*b* = .22, Wald χ2 = 6.40, *p* = .01, 95% CI [.05, .38]). Social conservatism was associated with less underestimation (*b* = -.07, Wald χ2 = 5.67, *p* = .02, 95% CI [-.13, -.01]). On the other hand, we observed that SDO was negatively correlated with overestimating hierarchy (*r* = -.08, *p* = .26), whereas social conservatism was positively associated (*r* = .06, *p* = .38), though neither relationship was significant. When entered into a simultaneous Poisson regression, SDO was negatively associated with overestimating hierarchy (*b* = -.17, Wald χ2 = 1.95, *p* = .16, 95% CI [-.40, .07]), whereas social conservatism was positively associated (*b* = .04, Wald χ2 = 1.38, *p* = .24, 95% CI [-.03, .11]), though both associations were not significant.

**Exact Replication**

We sampled 351 participants (*M* age= 32.74, *SD* = 11.60, 58.4% female; 256 Caucasian/White American; 21 African American/Black; 22 Latino/Hispanic American; 12 Asian/Asian American; 2 Jewish; 5 Native American; 2 Middle Eastern; 14 biracial/mixed race; 5 Other; 12 missing). We used the same stimuli, measures, and procedures as reported in the main manuscript. Our measure of social dominance orientation (α =.94) was reliable.

Across the image sets, we computed a score reflecting accuracy and direction of errors: specifically, for each of the four image sets, participants were given a score of 0 if they correctly identified the image they had previously seen, a score of -1 if they incorrectly indicated having seen a *less* hierarchical image than they actually had, and a score of +1 if they incorrectly indicated having seen a *more* hierarchical image. We summed participants’ scores across the four image sets to compute our variable of *hierarchy memory bias*. On this index, negative scores indicated an overall tendency towards underestimating the level of hierarchy one had seen previously, and positive scores indicated a tendency towards overestimating the same.

On average, this was a difficult task for participants: 35.6% of participants did not make the accurate selection for any of the four image sets, 46.4% made one accurate selection, 14.0% made two accurate selections, and 3.7% made three accurate selections. No participants were accurate for all four trials. On average, there was a slight bias towards remembering less hierarchy (*M* = -.42, *SD* = 1.56, one-sample *t*(348)= -5.07, *p* < .001).

We next turned to examine our central hypothesis. In zero-order terms, SDO was negatively correlated with memory bias, *r* = -.11, *p* = .05, whereas social conservatism was not associated (*r* = .01, *p* = .90). When we entered SDO and social conservatism as predictors into a simultaneous regression, we observed that SDO was negatively associated with hierarchy memory bias (*b* = -.40, β = -.13, *p* = .03, 95% CI: [-.76, -.02]). On the other hand, social conservatism was not significantly associated with memory bias (*b* = .03, β = .03, *p* = .58, 95% CI: [-.08, .13]). Thus, our results suggested that the higher an individuals’ level of SDO, the greater their tendency to incorrectly remember having seen less hierarchical organizations than they actually had seen (and the less their tendency to misremember having seen more hierarchal organizations).

Importantly, our outcome measure simultaneously took into account trials in which participants had overestimated hierarchy, had underestimated it, or had been accurate. In order to distinguish between these, we created two additional outcome measures: the first, labeled *underestimation of hierarchy*, simply indexed the number of trials in which participants had selected a less hierarchical image than they had actually seen. The second, labeled *overestimation of hierarchy*, indexed the number of trials in which participants had selected a *more* hierarchical image than they had actually seen.

We examined each of these outcomes separately. In zero-order terms, SDO was positively associated with underestimation of hierarchy (*r* = .11, *p* = .045) whereas social conservatism was significantly unassociated (*r* = -.01, *p* = .84). When entered into a simultaneous Poisson regression, SDO was significantly and positively associated with underestimation of hierarchy (*b* = .16, Wald χ2 = 5.33, *p* = .02, 95% CI [.03, .30]). Social conservatism was unassociated with underestimation (*b* = -.02, Wald χ2 = .63, *p* = .43, 95% CI [-.06, .02]). On the other hand, we observed that SDO was negatively but non-significantly correlated with overestimating hierarchy (*r* = -.07, *p* = .19), whereas social conservatism was unassociated (*r* = .00, *p* = 1.00). When entered into a simultaneous Poisson regression, SDO was negatively but non-significantly associated with overestimating hierarchy (*b* = -.15, Wald χ2 = 2.04, *p* = .15, 95% CI [-.35, .06]); social conservatism was not associated (*b* = .01, Wald χ2 = 0.03, *p* = .87, 95% CI [-.06, .07]).

1. **Full text of Supplemental Studies 1-4:**

**Supplementary Study 1**

**Method**

We collected data from a new sample of 498 White residents of the U.S. (*M* age = 26.83, *SD* = 9.61; 50.6% female) using SocialSci, of whom 486 provided data on all focal variables.

**Measures.** Participants completed the same set of measures as those in Study 1a (exceptions noted below), again within the context of a broader omnibus survey.

**Independent Variables.**

***Social Dominance Orientation* (α = .94), *Social Conservatism, and Social Class***were assessed as in Study 1a.

**Dependent Variables.**

***Inter-Ethnic Power Differences.*** Participants were asked to respond to the same items as in Study 1a. Because we had only White participants in this study, we assessed inter-ethnic power differences by taking the difference between rated power of Whites (rated as the highest power group; *M* = 6.14, *SD* = 1.27) and the average rated power of all other ethnic groups (*M* = 3.73, *SD* = .93).[[3]](#footnote-3)

***Inter-Sex Power Differences and Inter-Class Power Differences*** were assessed as in Study 1a.

*Social Welfare Support***(**α = .80), *Anti-Discrimination Policy Support* (α = .92), *Affirmative Action Support* (α = .85), *Legacy Admission Policy Support* (α = .86), and *New Hierarchy* (α =.77) were measured as in Study 1a.

**Results and Discussion**

As in Study 1a, perceptions of power differences across the ethnic, gender, and class domains were highly inter-correlated (average inter-item correlation: *r* = .60) and formed a reliable (α = .82) and unidimensional (eigenvalue =2.19, 73.1% variance explained) scale, labeled *overall power differences*.

We followed the same analytic strategy as in Study 1a. Specifically, we used Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro (Model 4) to investigate a process model in which SDO predicted opposition to our various measures of egalitarian social policy via diminished perceptions of intergroup power differences, controlling for social conservatism, participant gender (0= ‘Female’; 1= ‘Male’), and social class. As in Study 1a, we also examined an overall measure of support for egalitarian social policy constructed by averaging across the individual policies (α = .68), an index that was again more reliable when affirmative action was excluded (α = .71).[[4]](#footnote-4)

Overall, the results were highly consistent with those in Study 1a. Controlling for social conservatism and group membership, SDO was strongly associated with decreased perception of power differences between dominant and subordinate groups (see Supplementary Table 1).[[5]](#footnote-5) Moreover, as in Study 1a, reduced perception of power differences was associated with less support for egalitarian social policy. The only difference between the two studies in terms of this relationship was the marginal indirect effect for legacy admissions and the absence of a significant indirect effect for *new hierarchy* here.[[6]](#footnote-6)

Finally, we again assessed whether the indirect effects observed were moderated by membership in advantaged *vs.* disadvantaged groups. Consistent with Study 1a, we observed no evidence of moderated mediation for gender (index of moderated mediation: -.01 [-.07, .05]), and the indirect effects were significant among both males (indirect effect: -.15 [-.24, -.09]) and females (indirect effect: -.13 [-.20, -.08]). Our effects were also significant across the class spectrum (low social class: indirect effect = -.14 [-.21, -.08]; mean social class: indirect effect = -.13 [-.20, -.08]; high social class: indirect effect = -.13 [-.21, -.07]), with no evidence of moderated mediation (index of moderated mediation = .004 [-.03, .04]).

In sum, we replicated our effects in the context of real-world groups in another large sample of participants. We again observed that SDO is associated with perceiving less inequality between men *vs.* women, Whites *vs.* other racial groups, and the upper class *vs.* middle and lower classes. Importantly, this could not be accounted for by social conservatism or group membership (i.e., gender or class identity). Perceiving a smaller power gap between advantaged and disadvantaged groups again mediated the link between SDO and rejecting egalitarian social policies.

Supplementary Table 1. Regression coefficients predicting support for overall power differences and social policy support in Supplementary Study 1

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Overall Power Differences | Social Welfare Support | Anti-Discriminatory Policy Support | Legacy Admissions | New Hierarchy | Affirmative Action Support | Overall Egalitarian Policy Support |
| SDO (logged) | -.37\*\*\* | -.38\*\*\* | -.59\*\*\* | .21\*\*\* | .38\*\*\* | -.22\*\*\* | -.53\*\*\* |
| Social Conservatism | -.28\*\*\* | -.19\*\*\* | -.13\*\*\* | .13\*\* | .07 | -.02 | -.18\*\*\* |
| Social Class | -.03 | -.11\*\*\* | .03 | .09\* | .04 | .18\*\*\* | -.07\*\* |
| Sex | -.15\*\*\* | -.03 | -.00 | .02 | .12\*\* | -.06 | -.06† |
| Overall Power Differences | -- | .22\*\*\* | .16\*\*\* | -.09† | -.02 | -.00 | .18\*\*\* |
| Indirect effect (SDO 🡪 Power Differences 🡪 Policy) | -- | -.23 [-.34, -.14] | -.16 [-.26, -.07] | .10 [-.01, .11] | .02 [-.08, .11] | .00 [-.12, .12] | -.13 [-.20, -.08] |

*Note.* With the exception of the indirect effects, all coefficients reflect standardized beta coefficients. \*\*\* *p* < .001 \*\* *p* < .01 \* *p* < .05

† *p* < .10 Sex was coded 0= female, 1=male.

**Supplemental Study 2**

**Method**

We collected data from 84 U.S. residents (*M* age = 30.32, *SD* = 8.28; 62.7% female; 59 White/European American; 7 Asian/Asian American; 5 Black/African American; 4 Latino/Hispanic American; 1 Middle Eastern/Arab American; 8 missing) on Amazon’s mTurk platform, of whom 76 provided data on all focal variables. Participants read about a hypothetical conflict taking place between the administration and the graduate student union at a fictitious university (‘Rambert University’), a scenario modeled on one previously determined to reflect an asymmetric intergroup conflict (Kteily, Saguy, Sidanius, & Taylor, 2013, Study 2). Specifically, participants read that teaching contracts for the graduate students were negotiated between the two sides, and renegotiated every 10 years or if one of the sides sought a revision in the terms. Participants read that the graduate students had become increasingly unhappy with their situation, claiming that the terms of their contract were worse than those of teaching assistants elsewhere. Participants read that the administration felt that the contracts were fair, and that the students’ demands were unreasonable and unrealistic. Lastly, participants were told that the graduate student union was seeking an immediate settlement on 4 issues (salary, overtime pay, office space, and number of sick days). Previous research had established that, on average, participants reading this text perceived the administration as high in power relative to the graduate student union (Kteily et al., 2013). Participants read the scenario, and were then asked questions about it.

**Measures**

**Independent Variables.**

***Social Dominance Orientation*.** Participants completed the 16-item SDO-7 measure, using a 1 (‘Strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘Strongly agree’) scale (Ho et al., 2015; α = .94).

***Social*** ***Conservatism*** was assessed as in Study 1a.

**Dependent Variables.**

***Power Differences.*** In order to assess individuals’ perceptions of power differences between the graduate student union and the administration, we asked participants 4 questions, adapted from Kteily et al. (2013). A sample item was: “In general, when you think of the relations between the Administration and the Graduate Student Union at Rambert University, who do you think has more power?” (see section 8 of Supplemental Materials for full scale). Responses were provided on a 1 (‘Definitely Administration) to 7 (‘Definitely Graduate Student Union’) scale (α = .75). To keep coding consistent with previous studies, we reverse-scored this scale: thus, in line with earlier studies, higher scores indicated a greater perception of a power advantage for the dominant group (Administration) relative to the subordinate group (Graduate Student Union).

***Support for Egalitarian Social Policy.*** We assessed participants’ support for a range of policies or actions intended to equalize the relations between the two sides by asking participants to indicate their agreement with 4 statements, indexed on a 1 (‘Strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘Strongly agree’) scale. A sample item was: “I support collective action on the part of the Graduate Student Union to compel the Administration to revise their contract”; see section 10 of Supplemental Materials for full scale; α = .67).

**Results and Discussion**

As expected, participants, on average, perceived the administration to have more power than the graduate student union (*M* = 5.75, *SD* = 1.06; this was significantly above the midpoint of 4, indicating equal power: *t*(77) = 14.58, *p* < .001). Most importantly for our purposes, we were interested in whether this perception was influenced by individuals’ SDO levels, and predicted support for egalitarian social policies.

As in previous studies, we examined our hypotheses using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro (Model 4). Specifically, we investigated whether SDO exerted a significant indirect effect on support for egalitarian social policy via perceptions of power differences, controlling for social conservatism. Consistent with Studies 1a and 1b, SDO was uniquely associated with reduced perception of a power differential between the advantaged and disadvantaged groups (*b* = -.78, β= -.38, *p* = .002, 95% CI: [-1.22, -.33]). Social conservatism, on the other hand was correlated with power difference perceptions in zero-order terms (*r* = -.23, *p* = .045), but was not significantly associated with power difference perceptions controlling for SDO (*b* = -.05, β = -.08, *p* = .51, 95% CI: [-.19, .10]). Moreover, perceiving more power differences was associated with greater support for egalitarian social policy (*b* = .25, β = .21, *p* = .04, 95% CI: [.01, .49]), controlling for SDO and social conservatism. Indeed, the hypothesized indirect effect was significant (indirect effect: -.19 [-.51, -.01]).

Thus, we obtained results in a second fictional intergroup context that were consistent with those observed among real-world groups. The greater individuals’ motivational orientation towards inequality between groups, the smaller the power differential they perceived between the advantaged and the disadvantaged group. This was true controlling for individuals’ social conservatism, and occurred even though all participants in this study, as in Study 2, were exposed to exactly the same information about the intergroup relationship. Consistent with Study 1a and Study 2, perceiving a smaller advantage for the high power group was associated with less support for policies intended to revise the hierarchical status quo.

**Supplementary Study 3**

**Method**

We collected data from 170 participants (*M* age = 33.09, *SD* = 9.80; 57.8% female; 99 Caucasian/White American; 11 Black/African American; 8 Asian/Asian American; 7 Latino/Hispanic American; 1 Native American; 2 Jewish; 5 biracial/mixed race; 2 Other; 35 missing) on Amazon’s mTurk platform, of whom 134 provided data for all focal variables. As in Study 3b, we asked participants to look at a series of five images of organizational pyramids, and presented them with questions regarding the degree of hierarchy in the organizations depicted, and the need for challenge of the status quo. As in Study 3a, participants responded to a set of questions about each image while viewing it, and, once all images had been shown, were presented with measures of the independent variables and sociodemographics.

**Measures**

*Power Differences*(α= .73), *Support for Egalitarian Social Policy*(α= .93), *Social Dominance Orientation* (α=.83), and *Social Conservatism* were all assessed as in Study 3b.

**Results and Discussion**

As in Study 3b, we found, controlling for social conservatism (*b* = -.04, β = -.09, *p* = .26, 95% CI: [-.11, .03]), a significant relationship between SDO and the perception of power differences across the visually-depicted social system (*b* =-1.12, β = -.39, *p* <.001, 95% CI: [-1.59, -.64]). Again using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro (Model 4), we investigated whether social dominance orientation exerted a significant indirect effect on support for egalitarian changes to the status quo via perception of power differences, controlling for conservatism. Consistent with previous studies, the hypothesized indirect effect was significant (indirect effect: -.81 [-1.29, -.46]: thus, SDO was associated with reduced support for redistributive policy in the depicted hierarchical organizations through its link with decreased perceptions of a power advantage for groups at the top relative to those at the bottom.

**Supplementary Study 4**

**Method**

We collected data from 316 participants (*M* age = 33.42, *SD* = 10.32; 60.1% female; 247 Caucasian/White American; 22 Black/African American; 9 Asian/Asian American; 21 Latino/Hispanic American; 3 Native American; 4 Jewish; 1 Middle Eastern; 3 biracial/mixed race; 6 Other) on Amazon’s mTurk platform, all of whom provided data across all focal variables. The protocol was identical to that in Study 3b, with the following exception: We randomly assigned participants to receive (or not receive) an instruction intended to incentivize honest reporting. In the incentivized condition, participants read the following instruction, adapted from Waytz, Young, and Ginges (2014), who showed that it successfully reduced a form of motivated perception: “You will see a series of 5 images, and will be asked questions about each one. We have previously assessed perceptions about these images among a large sample of participants. The participant whose responses most accurately align with average responses in these previous data across images will receive a $12 bonus on mTurk.”

*Power Differences* (α= .74) and *Support* *for Egalitarian Social Policy* (α=.88), *Social Dominance Orientation* (α = .95)and *Social Conservatism* were assessed as in Study 3b.

**Results and Discussion**

Using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro (Model 4), we assessed whether experimental condition moderated the association between SDO and perceptions of power differences. Consistent with prior studies, and controlling for social conservatism (*b*= -.04,β = -.08, *p* = .14, 95% CI: [-.08, -.01]), SDO was negatively associated with perceptions of power differences (*b*= -.43,β = -.27, *p* = .001, 95% CI: [-.62, -.21]). Experimental condition (i.e., control *vs.* incentivization) had no main effect on perceived power (*b*=.02, β = .01, *p* = .81, 95% CI: [-.16, .19]). Moreover, it did not moderate the relationship between SDO and perceived power differences (*b* = -.04, *p* = .80, 95% CI: [-.38, .29]). Indeed, controlling for social conservatism, SDO was significantly associated with reduced power perceptions in both the control (*b*= -.40, *p* = .001, 95% CI: [-.65, -.16]) and incentivized (*b* = -.45, *p* < .001, 95% CI: [-.69, -.21]) conditions. Examining the moderation from the other perspective, the incentive had no effect on either individuals lower (*b* = .04, *p* = .73, 95 % CI: [-.20, .29]) or higher in SDO (*b* = -.00, *p* = .99,95% CI: [-.24, .24]).

We also investigated whether experimental condition moderated the indirect effect from SDO to rejection of egalitarian social policy through diminished power difference perceptions. Using Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro (Model 7), we observed no evidence of moderated mediation (index of moderated mediation = -.03 [-.26, .19]). Moreover, the indirect effect was significant in both experimental conditions (control: indirect effect= -.24 [-.41, -.08]; incentivized: indirect effect= -.27 [-.45, -.10]).

In sum, incentivizing participants to honestly report their perception of power differences in an abstract hierarchy had no influence on the relationship between higher SDO and perception of less inequality. We expected that the promise of a $12 bonus for accurately reporting perceptions that matched previously obtained average responses would motivate individuals to tell us what they honestly perceived. The fact that a strong incentive manipulation (previously shown to reduce biased attributions in another context using the same data collection platform; Waytz et al., 2014) had no effect whatsoever in influencing the SDO-power perceptions relationship is suggestive of the notion that individuals’ underlying orientations towards equality influence their perception of hierarchy, and not just their reporting of it. It is important to state that the lack of moderation cannot readily be explained by lack of statistical power, given that we ensured that each of the experimental and control conditions had large samples (more than 150 participants per condition), and found the hypothesized relationships in both conditions.

It is nevertheless worth noting the limitations of the approach taken in this study. Because there is no objectively true metric of the extent of hierarchy against which to assess participant responses on the images we gave them, we told participants in the experimental condition that we were assessing accuracy against previously obtained average responses on the same images. Although this was the best possible way of creating a plausible ‘accuracy’ metric to which we could tie participants’ incentives, it is nevertheless possible that participants approached the task by attempting to predict how the *average person* perceived these images, rather than by reporting how they themselves perceived the images. At the same time, given the very well-established false consensus effect (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), participants’ true perceptions should have strongly anchored their responses even if they did think about what the average person would have said.

1. **Full scale items**

**Study 1a:**

Anti-Discrimination Policy Support:

1. People have no business trying to ensure racial integration in society” (reverse-scored)
2. Society should make sure that minorities get fair treatment in jobs
3. People in society should do everything that they can to make sure that Whites and minorities go to the same schools
4. Society should do everything it can to help improve the economic condition of poor ethnic minorities
5. Society should do more to end the inequality that still exists between members of different social groups
6. We need to raise more awareness about the social conditions that put certain group members at a fundamental disadvantage
7. We need to take more action to help stamp out the subtle discrimination that members of certain social groups still face
8. There should be more research into whether ethnic minorities still face discrimination in the housing market

**Supplemental Study 2:**

Power differences:

1. In general, when you think of the relations between the Administration and the Graduate Student Union at Rambert University, who do you think has more power?
2. In the context of the current contract dispute, which side do you think has more power?
3. Which side has more to gain if an agreement between the two sides is reached? (reverse-coded)
4. Which side would benefit more from a continuation of the status quo?

Support for Egalitarian Social Policy

1. I support collective action on the part of the Graduate Student Union to compel the Administration to revise their contract
2. I think the University Administration should be legally forced to negotiate with the Graduate Student Union
3. The Graduate Student Union should be banned from going on strike to try to achieve their demands (reverse-coded)
4. The Administration should expel any Graduate Students who seek to disrupt classes in order to put pressure on the University to negotiate (reverse-coded)

**Study 3c:**

Anti-Egalitarianism (from McCloskey & Bann, 1979)

1. Efforts to make everyone as equal as possible should be (1=increased; 7= decreased)
2. Which of these opinions do you think is more correct? (1= All people would be about the same if they were treated equally; 7 = Like some fine race horses, some classes of people are just naturally better than others)
3. When it comes to poverty: (1=We could easily wipe it out if we really tried; 7= Some people will remain poor no matter what we do for them)

Anti-Egalitarianism (Hatemi et al. 2014)

1. One of the biggest problems in this country is that we don’t give everyone an equal chance
2. If wealth were more equal in this country we would have many fewer problems (reverse-coded)
3. This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are
4. We have gone too far in pushing equality in this country
5. Incomes should be more equal because of every family’s needs for food, housing, and so on

Traditionalism (from McCloskey & Bann, 1979)

1. People who are always trying to reform things are usually (1= People who really care about other people; 7 = Busybodies who do more harm than good)
2. Replacing traditional policies with new ones that seem attractive but have not been tested by experience is: (1= Often necessary for progress; 7 = Usually shortsighted and dangerous)
3. Trying to make sweeping reforms in a society as complicated as ours is usually: (1= Worth trying, despite the risks; 7 = Much too risky)
4. All groups can live in harmony in this country (1=Only if big changes are made in the system; 7 = Without changing the system very much)
5. In making changes in our society and government, it's usually better to be guided by: (1= A plan that tries out new ideas; 7 = The practical experience of the past)
6. The best way to improve our society is: (1= To follow an overall program or theory; 7 = To allow changes to develop naturally by themselves)
7. Laws and institutions which have existed for a long time: (1= Usually have much wisdom in them; 7 = Are often too old fashioned to be useful) (reverse-coded)

Traditionalism (from Ray, 1983)

1. Schoolchildren should have plenty of discipline
2. Erotic and obscene literature should be prohibited from public sale
3. Law and order is more important than letting every kook have their say
4. The rebellious ideas of young people are often a constructive source of change for the better (reverse-coded)
5. Laws against homosexuality are old-fashioned and wrong (reverse-coded)

Economic Conservatism (adapted from McCloskey & Bann, 1979; α = .90)

1. Can you depend on a person more if they own property than if they don't? (1=no; 7= yes)
2. Public ownership of large industry would be (1= A good idea; 7= A bad idea)
3. The way property is used should mainly be decided: (1= By the individuals who own it; 7= By the community, since the earth belongs to everyone) (reverse-coded)
4. The profit system (1 = Brings out the worst in human nature; 7= Teaches people the value of hard work and success)
5. A person’s wage should depend on (1=The importance of their job; 7= How much they need to live decently) (reverse-coded)
6. Private ownership of property : (1= Is as important to a good society as freedom; 7= Has often done more harm than good) (reverse-coded)
7. Working people in this country: (1= Do not get a fair share of what they produce; 7= Usually earn about what they deserve)
8. Providing medical care for everyone at public expense would: (1= Greatly improve the health of the nation; 7 = Reduce the general quality of medical care)
9. If some people can’t afford good housing (1= The government should provide it; 7 = They should work harder and save, until they can afford it)
10. Money spent by the government to relieve poverty is (1= Mostly a waste; 7 = A worthwhile investment) (reverse-coded)
11. Spending tax money to provide a college education for those who can’t afford it is: (1=A bad idea; 7 = A good idea) (reverse-coded)
12. In the matter of jobs and standards of living, the government should: (1= See to it that everyone has a job and a decent standard of living; 7 = Let each person get ahead on their own)
13. Who should bear the main responsibility of taking care of our senior citizens (1= The elderly themselves and their families; 7 = The community) (reverse-coded)
14. Which of these come closer to your own opinion? (1= No American family should be allowed to live in poverty, even if they don’t work; 7 = Any person who is able to work should not be allowed to receive welfare)
15. **References**

All references included in the supplemental materials can be found in the references section of the main manuscript.

1. Furthermore, we note that although we used tertiles so as to ensure equal sizes for the high, low, and average SDO groups, results were consistent if we used -1 and +1 SD from mean SDO as the cutoffs for the low and high SDO groups rather than tertiles. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. As with pearson’s correlations, spearman’s rho ranges from 0-1 and can be interpreted similarly. Although we include p-values for completeness, these should not be given undue weight given the number of datapoints on which the relationship is based. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Results are consistent when we assess inter-ethnic power differences as in Study 1a (i.e., perceived differences in power between Whites and African Americans). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Thus, as in Study 1a, we report results for this index excluding affirmative action. Consistent with Study 1a, however, all conclusions are unchanged when we include affirmative action in the composite. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. As in Study 1a, this was also the case when we examined the relationship between SDO and each of the context-specific power difference measures (i.e., power differences in each of the race, gender, and class contexts), controlling for social conservatism and the relevant group membership. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. As in Study 1a, patterns were opposite when we broke down affirmative action into its ‘outreach’ and ‘preference’ components. The ‘outreach’ variable followed the same general pattern as the remaining variables, and the indirect effect of SDO via perceptions of power differences on outreach was marginally significant (indirect effect: -.12 [-.29, .007]). The opposite indirect effect of SDO via perceptions of power differences on the preference dimension of affirmative action was not significant (indirect effect: .06 [-.05, .19]). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)